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Executive Summary 
  
    The long awaited integration of mobile telephone and retail financial services is 
beginning to emerge—in developing markets. To enhance the potential benefits from innovations 
in this domain, governments need to make complementary adjustments to domestic banking 
regulation and strengthen frameworks for international cooperation. In particular, as a highly 
regulated activity, deposit taking is insufficiently contestable for mobile operators to break into 
the market with enough independence from incumbent banks to stimulate valuable competition 
and innovation in payment networks. The success of mobile banking will also depend on the 
willingness and capacity of regulators to accommodate increasing international trade in retail 
financial services, new forms of distribution and customer due diligence rules that are more 
appropriate to less traditional markets. The paper provides an analysis of the relation between 
existing regulatory frameworks and the rise of mobile banking. And it outlines policy changes 
that governments should pursue in order to foster this form of innovation and target the benefits 
that it can bring, especially to consumers on the margins or excluded from modern financial 
services. 
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  The long awaited integration of mobile telephone and banking services is beginning to 
make an appearance - in emerging and developing markets. It has the potential to generate 
significant economic benefits, extending access to financial services and perhaps stimulating 
more fundamental changes and increased competition in the sector. Where the costs of 
traditional retail banking have been too high, or where their distribution arrangements are 
inappropriate to serve low income clients, mobiles are enabling new business models that 
could extend access to financial services in these markets. Regulatory reform may also enable 
mobile banks as a group to foster the rise of new, more efficient international retail settlement 
networks of particular relevance to the growing population of immigrants and their demand 
for cross-border banking services.  
  But these transformations may be constrained by financial and other regulatory 
frameworks. There are many formal barriers to the provision of payment and transaction 
services by non-banks. In the short term, current regulatory frameworks may also favour the 
inappropriate use of pre-paid accounts as substitutes for deposit accounts that provide 
consumers with greater protection. Added to these complications are formal and informal 
trade barriers that apply to cross-border services. Without adjustments to regulation at the 
domestic and international level, valuable legal, operational and organisational innovations 
important for the success of mobile banking will be impossible or too risky to implement.  
  Public authorities should be trying to ensure that they facilitate innovations in this 
area because of the potential benefits for financial sector development. Regulators cannot sit 
on the fence, waiting to see what happens. In particular, regulators should ease entry for a 
class of ‘transaction banks’ while reinforcing rules and monitoring regarding the use of 
depositors’ funds. Equally, they should capitalise on structural changes that the private sector 
may trigger in order to improve the ways in which they seek to preserve stability, protect 
consumers and stimulate innovation. And particularly where financial service innovations are 
emerging outside of the traditional scope of responsibility of financial market regulators, it is 
at a higher level of domestic and international governance that policy makers will need to 
conduct a fresh, sober review of how these objectives can most effectively be achieved. 
Governments that adhere to a cost/benefit approach must realise that a decision to leave 
regulation unchanged is equivalent to a decision to increase the real economic cost of it. 
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  There is also a certain degree of urgency. The network structure emerging from 
convergence between payments, retail banking and telecommunications will be difficult to 
alter once established. Hence it is all the more important that regulatory and institutional 
frameworks set the right incentives early on in the process of innovation to capture the full 
benefits that may be generated through the development of m-banking and payments.  
  The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides relevant 
background on the key components of retail payment and related financial services. This 
clarifies some of the business model choices that mobile banks will face. Then follows the 
main discussion of the regulatory implications of mobile banking. The last section concludes 
with policy recommendations.  
 
II. The Building Blocks of Retail Payments 
 
  The structure of retail payment services determines business model choices that 
mobile operators make, the areas in which innovations by them may be valuable, and the 
regulatory aspects of their decisions. Most importantly, payment providers are intermediaries 
which settle financial claims between certain types of transaction counter-parties. Secondary 
characteristics of payment services include the kinds of transactions they support, the ease of 
use of their payment instruments and the costs, risks and speed associated with settlement 
arrangements. The value of the payment service depends on the way a provider combines 
















Box 1: Money and Payments: what are they?  
In its most general form, a payment is  the transfer of ownership of assets, generally, but not 
necessarily money, to be accepted as a form of settlement of a claim. 
 
Money is a particular kind of asset that has the important features of being (1) a stable store of value 
and (2) a unit of account that (3) is widely accepted as a means to settle claims. In most economies, 
money is currency issued by a government mandated authority, such as the central bank, and has no 
intrinsic value itself, but acts as a placeholder for value and is by law defined as a valid asset in which 
to settle claims. But it is possible to have other instruments (and issuers) that are sufficiently stable 
and widely accepted to act as money. There are many instances of private institutions issuing claims 
accepted for payment in limited contexts: corporations issue stocks and bonds, retailers issue gift 
certificates, airlines issue air-miles, etc. 
 
Currency often takes the form of physical notes and coins. But it is increasingly held as a claim on a 
commercial bank (or script) at which clients hold accounts and from which they can effect payments. 
These claims on banks are generally backed up by deposit insurance and currency reserves held by the 
deposit taking institution with the central bank. The solvency of such banks is important for ensuring 
that deposits held with them remain a good store of value and can be exchanged for other assets. 
 
Establishing Ownership: Currency, like other assets, is of little use without the ability to 
unambiguously attribute ownership of it. Banknotes and coins are ‘bearer instruments’: ownership is 
generally based simply on possession. But the ownership of value held with banks is established by a 
complex set of rules, contracts and conventions as well as mechanisms to ensure compliance with 
them.  
 
Transfer Processes: Lastly, having ownership of an asset (or a claim thereto) is of little use if owners 
do not dispose of means to exchange them for other assets, goods or services. Beyond the simple 
physical process of exchanging notes and coins, institutions have developed a wide variety of 
accepted processes for transferring assets in the form of money. Most prominent is a bank-to-bank 
transfer of units from one account to another, often held with a separate banking institution. This can 
often be achieved using payments instruments or media (e.g. cheques, debit or credit cards, chips 
embedded in mobiles) issued by a depositors bank. In some cases, private issuers have experimented 
with true digital, encrypted cash (or e-money) that can be stored on a smart card and transferred to 
other cards with the help of specialised card readers
1. The specific process by which transfers are 
conducted include a whole variety of checks and balances, confirming amounts, accounts, availability 
of funds, the identities of the counter-parties, dates for transfer and the units of account being used as 
well as the possibility of conversion from one unit of account to another (e.g. foreign exchange). 
 
  Mobile based innovations only apply directly to some of these functions of payments. 
They have the potential in principle to generate improvements in efficiency. But in practice 
businesses may be unable to reap their full benefits without making adjustments to 
complementary processes, systems and market structures
2. The most important business 
strategy and regulatory issues mobile banks have to confront will arise precisely from 
                                                 
1 One early example of e-money is that developed by Mondex. There are however many other instances of 
payment services erroneously being referred to as e-money, in the sense of stored value. The fundamental 
difference between remotely held deposits and e-money, as a substitute for cash, should be that e-money is a 
‘bearer instrument’ – i.e. it embodies a claim that can be exchanged by its holder without the intervention or 
authorisation (visible or not) of a third party. 
2 This is a common feature: airplanes are of little value without airports, the internet would have little value 
without widespread use of personal computers, high speed train technology is of little use without improvements 
to tracks and stations along them for passengers, etc.  
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attempts to make adjustments to these kinds of complementary processes and structures in 
order to enhance the overall value of mobiles in payment and retail financial services. 
  This section discusses four pertinent features of retail payments. 1) Distribution: retail 
payments require a punctual or on-going relationship with individual users of the service. 2) 
The role of deposit taking: the way in which a payment intermediary facilitates transactions 
depends on the kinds of assets in which it supports transactions and the rights it has to act as a 
custodian of clients’ assets for settlement or other purposes. 3) Settlement networks: an 
intermediary needs to establish arrangements for settling claims (on behalf of clients) with 
other counter-parties. 4) Economies of scope: the extent to which these exist between 
payment and other financial services will influence the longer term prospects for mobile 
banking and hence the longer term regulatory approach.  
 
II.A. Distribution: acquiring and serving the retail client 
 
  The first essential component of payment services encompasses the client 
relationship: This includes the ability to cost effectively contact, profile and acquire clients 
and thereafter to equip them with the means to initiate (or receive) regular payments or 
conduct other banking operations. This is the area of payments in which the role of mobiles 
and mobile operators are (for the casual observer) most prominent: in several countries, 
customers are already using mobiles to transmit and receive payment instructions
3.  
  Three specific elements of distribution are of particular importance in terms of 
business and regulatory challenges facing aspiring mobile banks: Client acquisition, Access 
to payment facilities and information exchange. 
  Mobile operators may be able build on existing client bases to acquire clients at lower 
cost. This is key to any new service. A business has to find effective ways to make potential 
clients aware of and interested in the service. Given their broad penetration, relative to 
banking services, mobile phone operators in developing countries have the potential to 
acquire banking clients at a relatively low cost. The lower the costs are, the further down the 
income scale payment providers and banks will be able to extend their services profitably. 
  But some physical presence may be necessary in order to fulfil business and 
regulatory requirements. Some form of contractual agreement may need to be established and 
clients need to be issued with instruments or formalities necessary to use the payment service 
(e.g. a payment card, internet login and password, cheque book, etc.). They also need to be 
                                                 
3 Mobile users can send and receive SMS payment instructions, wave their phones in front of ‘contactless card’ 
reading systems and (of course) even call their bank directly to pass instructions to them verbally. 
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‘identified’ insofar as legally imposed client due diligence rules apply. Mobile operators need 
to find ways of fulfilling these requirements in a cost effective manner. The establishment of 
branches may be prohibitively expensive. To complete their business chain, mobile operators 
may increasingly turn towards independent or franchised agents. In this case important 
changes will also need to be made to regulations governing client due diligence and measure 
to combat money laundering or terrorist financing. Legacy processes have often been 
enshrined in law, leaving little room for new methods to emerge. 
  Secondly, once a client has been ‘acquired’, they must be provided with easy, and 
preferably low-cost means for on-going use of the payment service. Until the day when 
mobiles can either print and destroy cash or cash simply disappears from daily use, mobile 
banks will need to complete their payment services with other means to facilitate cash 
deposits and withdrawals: ATMs, branches, or retailers that provide a similar service. The 
potential to bring down total distribution costs and enhance access therefore depends 
critically on how mobile operators arrange for cash in out , including conversion between 
cash and electronic currency units, and physical cash management processes.  
 










































  Mobile banks are therefore seeking to outsource important functions to non-bank 
retailers. These agents can earn supplementary revenue by providing distribution functions to 
mobile banks. And if cash deposits exceed withdrawals, they can also potentially profit from 
earning interest. They can also thereby reduce the risk of theft of ‘cash in the till’
4. The 
emergence of banking models in which these and other distribution functions are provided 
almost exclusively through agents (such as airtime resellers) is unique
5. This aspect of mobile 
                                                 
4 In developing markets with poor transport infrastructure and law enforcement, the costs and risks associated 
with physical cash distribution can be very significant. 
5 There are countries such as the UK, where the distribution of investment products is characterised by large 
numbers of independent agents or advisors. 
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banking models therefore raises the prospect of operational risks with which regulators are 
unfamiliar. 
 
Box 2: Examples of non face-to-face account opening procedures  
PostIdent process (Germany): To open accounts at remote institutions, applicants can 
complete a form and have their identity validated by personnel at the Post Office. The 
applicant must present him or herself at the Post Office with the application and a valid form 
of identification and to sign the application in the presence of the postal worker who forwards 
the forms to the financial institution. 
 
Electoral rolle (United Kingdom): For the opening of internet based accounts, operators in 
the UK have been permitted to validate an applicant’s identity by checking the data submitted 
to them (name, address) against information available electronically on the electoral rolle.  
 
Wizzit (South Africa): is a mobile based bank that has introduced the use of ‘Wizzkids’ to 
complete the necessary identification process. These generally young employees are sent out 




  Lastly, mobile banks will have to design efficient means to gather information about 
their (prospective) clients and target product and sales to their individual profiles. 
Information about consumers is important in order to inform commercial decisions, estimate 
credit risks and shed light on client demand features. Historically, much of this information 
has come from costly long term investments in relationships. But where available, consumer 
and market statistics can substitute for relationship based information. Where they are not 
available, or are scarce or unreliable – such as in developing markets - mobile banks may 
need to revert to developing relationship based sources of information, especially if they are 
interested in expanding beyond basic payment services. Similarly, whereby many financial 
products are marketed and sold remotely in mature markets, low financial literacy and 
immature product standards in developing markets may make mobile banks more reliant on 
proximity based sales strategies than the advent of mobile communication might suggest. 
Face-to-face relations could be more important than in sophisticated markets and mobile 
banks may therefore need to develop a greater local presence, through partners or branches of 
their own, than they at first expect. Insofar as knowledge gathering of this kind remains 
expensive, mobile banks will curtail services to the poorest sections of society and seek to 
share costs with relevant partners. 
 
II.B. Currencies and the right to take deposit in them 
 
  Payments service providers need to process monies that clients want to hold. 
Providers may try to issue their own money, but must in that case ensure some form of 
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conversion with more widely accepted assets. More generally payment providers will choose 
to subscribe to existing currency systems. National currencies are likely to be a first choice. 
These have the advantage, both by convention and law
6, of being widely accepted as a means 
of settling claims. But they also come with constraints. In particular this means working 
within established rules and institutional structures that support them. Currency convertibility 
and the taking of deposits in foreign monies may be limited. Sources of liquidity – critical for 
settlement providers – will be limited by the issuer (i.e. the central bank) to a select number 
of banking institutions. And for each currency, settlement networks and providers will be 
limited. Mobile banks may have little choice between different exchange venues. 
  Processing currencies in a dematerialised form requires the intervention of institutions 
authorised to take deposits. Whereby anybody can hold bank notes and coins denominated in 
a national currency, issuing claims to it, such as in the form of a commercial bank deposit 
(also denominated in national currency), requires the help of an intermediary that has the 
vocation of safekeeping of such assets
7. In this form of commercial bank script
8, currency has 
the advantages of being both immaterial and an instrument for which legal and operational 
frameworks for the transfer of ownership are well established and accepted. By participating 
in the use of these network goods (and payment media) a new payment provider (such as a 
mobile bank) can quickly achieve the scope necessary to settle claims for its clients. But to 
take advantage of these features, a payment provider needs either to seek authorisation to take 
deposits itself or to work with an institution that is already authorised. As further discussion 
will demonstrate, this constraint can have important strategic consequences for mobile bank’s 
business models. 
  ‘Deposit taking’ is of particular importance for mobile banks serving low income 
clients in developing economies. The arrangements that intermediaries use for settlement 
between clients and their counter-parties not only influence the commercial viability of their 
service but also determine the risks to which different participants can be exposed. If an 
intermediary settles its client’s claim with the final counter-party before having ensured 
receipt of the client’s funds, they expose themselves to the risk of non-payment. The clients 
of mobile banks operating in emerging and developing markets are likely to be poor, some of 
                                                 
6 National currencies are often declared as ‘legal tender’ for transactions, implying that counter-parties cannot 
refuse them by law as a media with which to settle claims. 
7 Up until very recently it was possible to hold some stocks and bonds independently of intermediaries, in paper 
certificates. In the UK some such certificates still exist. But most markets have now moved towards full 
dematerialisation. 
8 This is a term for money held with banks, denominated in national currency, but in principle a claim on the 
issuing commercial bank. The safety of these deposits is based on the reserves held by such banks with the 
central bank and issuer or national currency. 
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them ‘unbanked’ and many without stable incomes or legal title to property. Mobile (as well 
as other) banks will be less inclined to extend credit to them, even for settlement of small 
payments, unless they earn fees thereby that compensate for these risks. Hence all the more 
important it will be for mobile payment providers to take deposits or process transactions for 
institutions that do. It is in this context that licensing restrictions on ‘deposit taking’ weigh 
particularly heavily on the provision of payment services to the poor.  
 
II.C. Settlement Networks: achieving the right commercial configuration 
 
  The last step in the payments chain requires direct or indirect links to settle claims 
with a relevant set of transaction counter-parties. The value of the service expands more than 
proportionately with the scope of this network: the more persons with which transactions can 
be completed the greater the benefit of the payment service. Together, mobile banks could 
have the potential to introduce significant innovations to settlement networks of great benefit 
to consumers and the un-banked. But their actual scope and incentives to do so are currently 
constrained by barriers to deposit taking and by the dominance of existing settlement and 
inter-bank networks and the regulatory structures that support them. 
  New mobile banks and payment providers face strategic choices regarding how they 
facilitate settlement for their clients with third parties. There are three basic, non-exclusive 
options. Transactions can be processed by a partnering (wholesale) bank. Such a service 
provider will be able to make use of its own extensive links and high volume to process 
smaller firms’ payments at low cost. Secondly, a bank may seek to settle claims through 
direct membership of a multi-lateral clearing house. These are central hubs within dense 
networks where members settle claims between each other on behalf of clients at regular 
intervals. Most clearing houses are domestic in scope
9. Lastly, the bank may operate a 
number of correspondent banking relationships, particularly to support settlement in foreign 
markets. Payment providers need to balance the costs of individual links against the volume 
and commercial value of transactions that can be handled by them, as maintaining a number 
of international correspondent banking relationships can be prohibitively expensive, 
especially if transaction volumes are low.  
  New entrants, such as mobile banks, will find that existing settlement networks are 
useful for gaining quick access to counter-parties, and therefore achieving sufficient scope, 
                                                 
9 International retail clearing systems are only just beginning to evolve. The European Banking Association 
(EBA) operates a set of pan-European clearing solutions (STEP 1, STEP 2) that are gaining in volume. And in 
the wholesale markets, large international banks have created a purpose built vehicle for real time international 
currency clearing called CLS. Lastly, to some extent the postal networks (such as Eurogiro) and Western 
Union’s proprietary system can be considered as forms of international clearing systems.  
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but could constrain their potential to innovate in future. In developing markets, existing 
domestic retail clearing systems may actually provide very poor scope and efficiency
10. As 
member-based and owned institutions, clearing houses are often well designed to get 
members to cooperate. But it can be very difficult to initiate change. Members will have 
ample scope to reject or hinder developments that are of disproportionate advantage to new 
entrants. For instance, the scope and scale of mobile banks supporting remittances may be too 
small to warrant investments or innovations by international banks with large existing 
correspondent networks.  
  Solitary innovators stand little chance of transforming existing networks, but there 
may be scope for fruitful collaboration between mobile banking providers. Together they 
may be able to establish alternative settlement networks that not only serve their interests but 
benefit a wider range of stake holders through enhanced competition with incumbent 
networks
11. Whether can occur will depend on (1) the extent to which a critical mass of 
mobile banks with similar interests emerges at one time, independent of the constraints of 
strategic partnerships with incumbent banks; (2) the capacity of mobile banks to apply 
advances in technology to facilitate more secure and rapid settlement, (3) the ability to 
develop lower cost services in areas such as international remittances for which existing 












                                                 
10 Where domestic retail settlement infrastructure only captures a small portion of the population, the benefits 
from participation in them by mobile banks may be quite limited. It is in such countries that the role of mobile 
banks may be particularly valuable as a substitute to existing structures.  
11 Familiar examples include not only the competition between internet, mobile and fixed line telephone 
companies but also historically, in transport, between canals and rail, rail and automobile, ships and airlines, 
etc.. Each mode operates within its own network but can entail competition between firms within it as well as 
between the network as a whole and other networks. Is important to note in each case the role that inter-modal 
transport facilities (exchanges) have played in making networks complementary. 
12 The BIS/World Bank report on General principles for international remittances highlights existing 
international correspondent banking networks are not well adapted to low value retail flows. 
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Box 3: Remittances and the international stepping stone for non-banks 
International remittance services are an important area for the application of mobile led payment and 
banking services and a potential spring-board to wider development. The remittance market it is  
poorly served by existing banking services and settlement structures. But as a growing market  it 
offers increasing revenue potential for new entrants. Moreover, where mobile banks are more adept 
than incumbents, it can provide them with a solid foothold on an important future market and point of 
entry for domestic markets.  
 
But as an international financial service, remittance and related banking services inevitably confront a 
more complex regulatory and policy framework than purely domestic services. Mobile operators may 
face operational constraints due to (a) restrictions on cross border trade in retail financial services, (b) 
currency convertibility and (c) differences between national legislative and regulatory frameworks 
that erode opportunities for economies of scale to be achieved a cross-borders environment
13. 
Moreover it is in this cross-border context that authorities are most concerned to stem money 
laundering and terrorist financing and hence most strictly apply customer due diligence rules. 
 
Although the hurdles to facilitating cross-border remittance and banking services may seem high, the 
benefits that could derive from the necessary policy changes are also large. There are an estimated 
175 million international migrants with multiple family members. Moreover, the remittance market 
provides a bridge from developed economies into emerging and less advanced economies that could 
enhance access to finance.  
 
II.D. Economies of scope with other financial services 
 
  The strength of economies of scope between payments and other financial services 
will influence the investments that mobile banks will make.  Large scale, profit-oriented 
investment in the sector will depend on the longer term opportunities to grow the business 
that economies of scope support. Most existing business models in mobile led banking rely 
on taking only small deposits from clients, often outside the framework of traditional retail 
account structures. But deposit taking is often just a first step towards other revenue sources. 
Insofar as there are synergies between limited deposit taking and broader banking services 
(loans, savings, investments), successful mobile-led banks may increasingly seek to expand 
their activities into domains which warrant greater regulatory scrutiny. 
  Yet mobile banks may develop strategies that do not rely on economies of scope 
between deposit taking and lending. Many banking industry observers believe that the sector 
is tending towards an increasing diversity of business models in which universal banks will 
sit along side more specialised institutions
14. One type of institution that could become more 
prominent is a transaction bank that concentrates on providing payment services, receiving 
and disbursing funds on behalf of its clients but not itself ‘producing’ balance sheet based 
financial products that put client’s deposits at significant risk. Such an institution would hold 
                                                 
13 Recent work, led by the BIS and World Bank , is helping to establish General Principles for International 
Remittance Services that should contribute to a reduction in unnecessary policy divergence. 
14 See for instance Padoa-Schioppa, Llewellyn  and Geiger regarding structural change in the industry. 
 11 
these funds in low risk assets and act as an introducing agent for the purchase of more 
specialised credit, savings or investment products.  
  Whether or not mobile banks can cost effectively experiment with these kinds of 
business models will depend on regulations. Traditional legal frameworks have evolved 
around business models that suggest strong economies of scope between deposit taking and 
lending business. If you are licensed to take deposits you can make loans; but an institution 
that makes loans does not automatically have a license to take deposits
15. The results of 
mobile banks’ experimentation will not only feed policy debate on where the boundaries of 
regulation should lie but also of course determine the nature of regulation to which mobile 
banks are ultimately exposed. 
 
III. Regulatory Constraints and Implications 
 
  The discussion so far has highlighted a number of issues that should be of concern to 
both policy makers and potential mobile banks. If governments are to facilitate mobile 
banking innovations while remaining faithful to the aims of effective regulation, they need to 
understand the ways in which authorities could not only reduce constraints on innovation 
them but also enhance financial sector stability and development. Although regulation can 
benefit consumers and the wider economy by fostering stability and correcting market 
failures, this is often at the risk of disproportionately curtailing competition and innovation – 
and the benefits that they can generate.  
  Three particular issues are discussed in this section: 
•  Entry restrictions on deposit taking and consequences for settlement networks.  
•  Regulatory constraints on distribution models  













                                                 
15 Consumer lending is a relevant area in which non-depositor takers have been increasing market share. 
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Box 4: Relevant elements of banking system regulation 
Banking and payment services are subject to a wide range of regulatory and supervisory practices. This table 
provides a brief overview of objectives and instruments relevant to the development of mobile banking.  
Area of Regulation  Objectives  Representative Instruments 
Systemic regulation  
 
 
Preserve stability of the overall sector 
and guard against the transmission of 
failures throughout the system. 
Limits on entry and risk taking, 









Guard against excessive risk taking by 
depository institutions or fraud; small 
retail clients are considered to be ill 
placed to assess and monitor the 
health and good conduct of 
institutions, to the public sector may 
have a role in fulfilling this role. 
Authorisation requirements such as 
management experience, base capital, 
controls, operational standards; 




Payment system supervision 
 
 
Preserve the stability of payment 
systems, forestall contagion, ensure 
public confidence in retail systems 
Minimum operational and technical 
standards for membership; financial 







Protect consumers from fraud or 
exploitation by providers with 
significant market power; ensure 
minimum disclosure and quality 
standards for clients; support 
confidence in the financial system. 
Conduct of business rules, 
competition policy, ombudsman 
schemes, minimum disclosure and 
contracting standards, consumer 





Prevent use of the financial system for 
the laundering of money, criminal   
activity and terrorist funding. 
Customer due diligence rules, 
transaction reporting requirements 
(e.g. suspicious transactions). 
 
III.A. Deposit taking 
 
  Probably the single most important regulatory issue pertaining to mobile banking 
concerns deposit taking. Some limitations and conditions on the taking of deposits from the 
public are generally justified - and in any case very unlikely to disappear
16. But they may 
unnecessarily limit the benefits of mobile banking. By restricting the business of deposit 
taking, current regimes effectively encourage mobile operators to adapt billing arrangements 
to payments instead of proposing more efficient and well protected deposit facilities to their 
customers. Secondly, regulation reinforces aspiring mobile banks strategic dependence on 
incumbent financial institutions. Subsequently, this reduces the chances that mobile banks 
will emerge in sufficient numbers and with sufficient independence from incumbents to lead 
innovations in retail settlement networks. It is in this last domain, that the unique market 
position of mobile operators can make their biggest contribution, by providing the means to 
improve the dynamic efficiency of the payments market. 
  Non-cash payments require the participation of an institution authorised to act as a 
custodian of depositors’ funds. Put another way, non-cash payments need to start from or end 
                                                 
16 Although there is a case for so-called free banking and the intervention for example of private deposit 
insurance, this is a situation which for political reasons is very unlikely to arise (if ever) during the timeframe 
relevant to the development of mobile banking. 
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in an account held with a bank. New entrants in payment services, such as mobile operators, 
must either have the right themselves to act within a defined scope as custodians of 
depositors’ funds or work with banking institutions that have authorisation.  
  In the absence of a banking license, mobile operators (and other non-banks) seeking 
to provide payment and banking services will be reliant on partnering banks. This deposit 
taking institution ‘owns’ a significant part of the client relationship and has an influence on 
the emergence and evolution of new payment service providers
17. Of course contracting can 
be arranged to ensure that the branding and distribution channels for these clients remain 
linked to the mobile operator. But in the event that a change of banking partner is sought, the 
mobile operator may be legally unable to take its clients with it. Moreover, the partnership is 
likely to be a long term investment, entailing strategic limitations on the mobile operator’s 
future prospects. 
What are the essential elements of regulation? 
  a) A widely - accepted need for public sector regulation: Limitations on deposit taking 
are justified on the grounds that deposit holders may be poorly placed to judge the safety of 
their bank or to monitor its activities that may put its stability – and their funds - at risk. 
Regulation has a role to play in preventing inexperienced or potentially dishonest firms from 
entering the market enforcing limits on the risks that banks take. But ideally it should aim to 
do so in a manner that constrains as little as necessary enterprises’ potential to innovate and 
compete. 
  b) Entry restrictions on deposit taking: To take deposits – for safekeeping or the 
settlement of claims with third parties - an operator will in most circumstances require a 
banking license. The process to apply for a banking license can be ill defined, lengthy, 
conditions to fulfil costly and approval uncertain. Moreover, in many jurisdictions, mobile 
operators may be formally prohibited by various laws from obtaining a banking license or 
owning a bank. Some jurisdictions do not allow banks to be owned by non-financial 
enterprises (e.g. in the US
18). In others there may be restrictions on the maximum share that 
any one (non-bank) investor may hold in the equity of a given bank. Interestingly, the reverse 
is less often true: Banks frequently own important or even controlling stakes in commercial 
enterprises. Additionally, ownership of domestic banks by foreign institutions may be 
                                                 
17 Of course, this decision continues to be a function of solutions available in the market. 
18 The issue of non-bank ownership of financial institutions is currently a topic of debate in the US, where this is 
restricted, due to attempts by Walmart to acquire a specific kind of banking institution (an Industrial Loan 
Corporation) and, as competitors fear, perhaps expand into retail payments and banking services. See for 
example the recent commentary by Wallison (2006). 
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prohibited, strictly limited or subject to additional constraints
19. Beyond these measures to vet 
new applicants, regulators subsequently monitor and control the risks that authorised 
institutions take and to which they expose depositors’ funds. 
  Some exceptions to traditional frameworks for deposit taking are emerging. First, for 
limited types of purchases, mobile operators can use pre-paid (or post paid) accounts as a 
means to settle retail transactions. This allows them to use existing processes for payments, 
but provides depositors with less legal clarity and protection than with bank deposits. 
Informal arrangements have also allowed mobile operators engaged in low value funds 
transfers to take retail deposits on condition that the funds are subsequently held in highly 
liquid assets with regulated institutions
20. 
What are the potential benefits from relaxing deposit taking restrictions further? 
  The greatest benefits from mobile banking may lie not in the simple application of 
mobile telephones to payment processes but from the emergence of a new class of financial 
institution. The easing of entry restrictions will render retail deposit taking a more contestable 
activity. Secondly, it may generate scope for the emergence of new retail clearing and 
settlement networks.  
  Innovations in inter-institutional payments are difficult to achieve. As a network 
service they require significant coordination between users/operators. Introducing changes 
requires a similar degree of alignment between members’ interests and capacities. Once 
arrangements are in place, such as in existing clearing houses, their dominance is often very 
difficult to displace. New systems face an uphill battle to establish themselves. Facilitating 
innovation and competition in these networks is notoriously difficult
21. Although regulatory 
investigations have almost invariably concluded that there is indeed a lack of competition in 
these networks
22, there is little consensus regarding practical regulatory solutions to stimulate 
competition.  
                                                 
19 Banks may need to employ local directors, there may be restrictions on opening new branches or local 
shareholders / partners may be required. They must also fulfil minimum requirements regarding capital, 
management experience, systems and operations; all of these impose costs on start-ups. The World Bank 
Database on regulation provides further examples.  
20 In the Philippines, GLOBE has obtained exemptions from general licensing requirements from the public 
authorities, enabling them to take limited deposits from customers for transfers and retail payments. More 
formal arrangements have been put in place in the European Union where ‘e-money’ institutions are similarly 
allowed to receive low value deposits from the public for the purpose of settling payment, under the condition 
that depositors’ funds are held at a regulated commercial bank or in specified assets money market funds, such 
as government bonds or high interest term deposits. 
21 The challenges of achieving an integrated European retail settlement structure are well known within the 
industry. Progress has been painfully slow and there is still no guarantee that public sector intervention and 
regulation will really produce the desired results. 
22 See for instance the much cited Cruickshank report on the UK wholesale banking market. 
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  Mobile operators may be able to lead the rise of new payment networks that compete 
with existing arrangements. As new entrants seeking to develop financial services, they have 
incentives to develop new structures and little to loose by working around legacy systems. 
Whether this potential comes to fruition will depend on a number of conditions. Mobile 
banks will need to emerge in sufficient numbers, with complementary networks and payment 
volumes and with significant independence from incumbent banks. Alternatively, if too many 
mobile banks enter the market, coordination between them may become too difficult to agree 
on new arrangements
23. Compatibility with existing inter-bank payments systems will also be 
required at some level. This may be an issue for competition authorities. If these conditions 
are fulfilled, aspiring mobile banks may be able to create parallel settlement structures that 
contribute to the dynamic efficiency of the sector
24.   
  There are three particular areas in which mobile banks might be able to address 
deficits in current arrangements.  
(1) International payments: Infrastructure is not efficient for international retail (P2P) 
business. Although demand for cross-border retail payments remains low, 
international trade, migration and cross-border investment should lead it to increase
25. 
Given the foot hold that mobile banks already have in the remittance markets, they 
may be well placed to lead the development of an international clearing house, 
facilitating inter-operability between mobile banks and related financial service 
providers
26.  
(2) Real-time P2P transfers: Customers appear to appreciate real time P2P transfers. 
Although currently only supported within closed networks, this service feature could 
be a focus for mobile operators to expand. Indeed, the long delays during which funds 
are often unavailable to senders or receivers (using bank to bank transfers) are a 
frequent subject of consumer complaints
27.  
(3) Domestic payment systems in developing markets. In many of the markets which 
mobile banks are targeting, domestic clearing systems are limited in scope and 
performance. Mobile banks may face less formidable competition,  in them and find 
                                                 
23 More research is warranted into the conditions under which new inter-mobile bank settlement arrangements 
are likely to be most valuable and most likely to arise. 
24 Other examples of parallel network competition include the rise of credit cards in the US as an alternative to 
slow, costly multi-lateral payment arrangements, such as cheque clearing systems. 
25 See analysis and comments by Geiger on future challenges in payments for banking industry. 
26 A recent announcement by the GSMA and Mastercard suggests that mobile operators may indeed seek to 
develop their own multi-lateral financial settlement arrangements. 
27 See for instance comments in consumer surveys and responses to consultations conducted by the European 
Commission in the context of formulating new European payments legislation.(e.g. Qualitative Study Among 
Cross-Border Buyers of Financial Services In the European Union. Report produced by OPTEM, December 
2003). Similar concerns have been cited in investigations in the US and Canadian retail banking markets.  
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new systems easier to establish. Where mobile banks and other private sector 
institutions can profitably extend networks to this under-served client base, they will 
also enhance the overall reach and quality of domestic retail payment systems
28.  
 











1 credit  int'l SWIFT  int'l as % of 
 transfers messages
2 domestic Brazil India Kenya Turkey South Africa
Germany 984000 77092 8% 112 171 18 620 128
Spain 256000 15558 6% 41 50 4 225 37
France 1737000 31315 2% 38 17 1 22 14
Sweden 313000 6573 2% 7 16 3 35 15
UK 2012000 51580 3% 51 483 49 455 468
notes
1: reference domestic figures are for countries countries shown are based on the following clearing systems:
    Germany: RPS; Spain: SNCE; France: SIT; Sweden:Bankgirot; UK:BACS
2: includes all non-domestic MT100 type messages sent to or received from indicated countries in 2004 worldwide
SWIFT messages give an indication of bank-to-bank retail transfers via interbank networks but do not reflect total retail transfer volumes
(selected countries)
SWIFT MT100 transfers sent to (tsd, 2004): Transaction volumes, in thousands, 2004
What then is the impact of the existing regulatory framework? 
  Deposit taking regulation constrains the strategic options open to mobile operators 
interested in developing banking services. They may also in the short run favour use of pre-
paid accounts that both constrain mobile operators’ commercial freedoms and provide less 
protection to consumers. By making it difficult and costly at an early stage of their 
development to take deposits from clients, regulation favours (1) business models in which 
mobile operators partner with banks, not just as wholesale services providers but also as retail 
account holders, and (2) closed network payment services similar to those used by the retail 
industry. These restrictions have consequences on business model evolution. They are likely 
to reduce the number of independent mobile banks and, subsequently, the chances that they 
create efficient settlement arrangements between themselves, outside the constraints of 
established inter-bank settlement networks
29.  





                                                 
28 International institutions have dedicated considerable resources of late towards improving payment systems in 
developing countries (See for example projects funded through the multi-lateral fund for financial sector 
development called FIRST Initiative (www.firstinitiative.org) as well as reviews of payments systems produced 
by the Bank for International Settlements (www.bis.org)). But the modernisation of systems alone cannot extend 
access to them for the unbanked. 
29 It is important to remember that at some level, perhaps wholesale payments, inter-operability between new 











  At a first stage, each aspiring mobile bank is faced with a decision regarding how to 
develop the initial service and acquire some clients. There are three alternatives: 
 
I. Initial market entry strategy 
1.  Find a banking partner: partner with an existing bank capable of opening and 
operating the relevant retail client accounts and introducing their existing clients 
to the new mobile facilities. 
advantages: The regulatory and legal framework will raise few if any barriers 
and the banking partner will bring valuable experience, network interfaces and 
technology to the partnership. 
disadvantages: The strategic and financial interests of both parties may not be 
well aligned. Existing retail banks have less incentive to invest in lower income 
clients to whom they can market fewer add-on products; pricing appropriate for 
these clients may undermine or conflict with pricing/profitability of services to 
existing clients. For the mobile partner, client ownership may be legally under 
the control of the deposit taker, even if branding from the mobile operator 
remains prominent. 
2.  Hold low value accounts in an ambiguous or restrained legal framework: 
Legislation permitting, the mobile operator may: a), take low value deposits from 
individual clients for use in a broad range of low value payments, or b) allow 
‘pre-paid’ sums for communication services to be used to settle transactions for a 
wider range of products and services, the providers of which agree to process 
payments via the mobile operator. Both options require the services of a 
wholesale bank to link to the inter-bank market.  
advantages: Under both (a) and (b), the client relationship remains legally and in 
terms of branding closely linked to the mobile operator. 
disadvantages: Under both (a) and (b), the regulatory structure may prove to be 
restrict expansion beyond low value deposits into broader and more profitable 
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services. Moreover, as ad-hoc regulatory ‘solutions’ to market pressures, these 
frameworks will inevitably be revised. Subsequent evolution may require costly 
or awkward changes. 
3.  Acquire a banking license: The operator may, where permitted, seek to obtain a 
banking license. This could be done through a new application to licensing 
authorities or the acquisition of an existing bank. 
advantages: With its own banking license, the mobile operator has well defined 
scope to develop payment and financial services and retains the full legal client 
relationship. 
disadvantages: The acquisition of a banking license can be expensive in terms of 
time and money, with success uncertain. The acquisition of a banking license by 
purchasing an existing bank is also subject to well-recognised strategic and 
operational risks. A take-over can also be prohibited by the banking authority.  
 
  A mobile operator which has entered the market through one of the paths outlined 
above is faced with subsequent choices as to how to expand the depth and scope of their 
settlement network.  New entrants will base their settlement network on some mixture of the 
two types of arrangements outlined below:  
 
II. Mobile banks seek to expand the scope and reach of their network 
1.  Settle retail claims directly with other mobile banks (and other new entrants):  
  advantages: A new structure for international retail settlement would help to 
consolidate the position of mobile operators in the remittance market and could allow 
operators to develop new era settlement systems that support real time, lower cost 
settlement between individuals.  
  disadvantages: The value of a parallel structure for settlement between this new kind of 
bank will depend on the number and distribution of appropriate new entrants and the 
extent to which their respective clients have matching demands for inter-operability.  
2.  Settle retail claims via existing banking partners and their domestic and international 
inter-bank settlement structures.  
advantages: It is relatively easy to plug into existing domestic and inter-banks 
settlement structures which, through their links can provide rapid access to settlement 
with virtually any other counter-parties. 
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disadvantages: The international settlement processes can be long and expensive. And 
the dependency on existing banking structures can sap potential for more efficient 
mobile led solutions, particularly in high cost markets. 
 
  At stage one: Existing regulatory frameworks favour option 1. 
  Initially, mobile operators have favoured option 2b as a means to experiment with 
distribution–like services, enabling mobile customers to purchase virtual goods and either 
debiting amounts from their pre-paid accounts or adding them to their monthly bills. But 
these developments have not expanded into broader banking services.  
  For mobile operators with broader ambitions, regulation favours option I.1., a 
partnership with an existing bank. It allows quick time to market and avoids many regulatory 
risks and uncertainties. But looking towards future development many mobile operators have 
a preference for options that provide them with greater control over client relationships
30. 
Some have therefore chosen option I.2a (where it exists). Yet, as stated above, this option has 
its own limitations (will caps on deposits be removed? Will the regulator continue to respect 
the exemption? Where does future growth come from?) and is from a regulatory perspective 
a matter of working in a grey area that in the long run must be revised. So far the author is 
aware of only two instances of operators choosing to pursue the third option, but neither has 
used it (yet) as a means to subsequently expand into domestic banking
31.  
  At stage two: Mobile banks that have maintained independence will have a greater 
propensity to collaborate with other independent mobile banks. 
  First stage market entry strategies chosen by mobile banks affect their second stage 
choices. Critically, decisions at stage two also depend on the choices made by competitors 
and other aspiring mobile banks. The important assumption is that mobile operators that have 
chosen to enter the market in partnership with an existing retail bank (option I.1.) are less 
likely to pursue the development of new mobile settlement arrangements than mobile banks 
that have maintained greater independence (e.g. through market entry option I.2. or I.3.). The 
partnering banks will already have a payment infrastructure and network which stands to gain 
by increased volume. Investing in new structures will be costly. And mobile banks would risk 
                                                 
30 GLOBE and M-Pesa in particular have tried to develop service models in which they maintain full client 
relationships on the retail side by holding client funds in pooled nostro accounts with one or more commercial 
banks, instead of opening inidividual retail accounts for them with a designated banking partner. 
 
31 A1 Bank, a subsidiary of the Austrian mobile operator A1, acquired a domestic banking license in 2002. They 
are the first mobile operator worldwide to acquire a full banking license . Vodafone has a banking license in 
Albania.  
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having to write-off significant sunk costs if they decided to exit the partnership or 
substantially modify its structure. 
  It should be clear that regulatory changes that make it easier for mobile operators to 
enter the market without heavy reliance on an incumbent partner bank, subsequently increase 
the likelihood of mobile banks pursuing new settlement arrangements. This could be 
achieved for instance by making it easier and more economically viable for mobile banks to 
take deposits from clients (expanding the attraction of options I.2 or I.3), at least for the 
purpose of facilitating retail payments.  
  Regulators will probably want to have better estimates of the benefits that they could 
generate. Although there is merit to gathering more information, this is a misguided approach 
to the dilemma that will inevitably lead to policy paralysis. It does not take account of the 
experimentation that mobile operators might engage in if they were in a better position to 
take deposits for the purpose of settling retail payments. It is this enhanced freedom to 
experiment which itself creates value for the economy, regardless of the specific innovations 
that it produces. The benefits of change must be seen equally in terms of the reductions in 
unnecessary constraints on operational freedoms. From this perspective, regulators should 
continually seek less intrusive means of pursuing their key objectives.  
III.B. Distribution models 
Outsourcing: a commercial and regulatory concern 
  As a low cost and high proximity ‘payment gateway’, mobiles facilitate the 
development of lower cost retail banking distribution and payment facilities. But the mobile 
by itself can only fulfil certain functions. Where bank branches and ATMs do not exist or are 
too expensive to set up, mobile banks are increasingly seeking to outsource account opening, 
cash based and other activities dependent on proximity to non-bank agents or partners.  
  Distribution remains one of the last frontiers for outsourcing in classical retail 
banking. Primary concerns that motivate guidelines for outsourcing are:  
 
•  Reliability: Concern may be expressed regarding the ability of banks to ensure the 
quality of procedures outsourced to agents (e.g. account opening, client identity 
validation); there may also be concerns about control over or trustworthiness of 
staff.  
•  Security: For cash is concerned, banks and agents must ensure that funds are 
sufficiently protected from theft. Servicing remote agents with wholesale cash 
services (including the transport of banknotes) can be very risky and costly. 
 21 
•  Continuity: Where agents may go out of business or terminate distribution 
agreements with mobile banks, clients in their catchment area will need to be 
provided with alternative means to access their funds and other services from the 
bank. 
•  Competence: Banks outsourcing account opening and advice functions to external 
staff will have difficulty ensuring their level of training and competence.   
 
  Many of these risks are likely to be of as much concern to the operators as the 
regulators, especially in a competitive market. So far authorities have taken a very 
constructive approach to the use of agents by mobile banks. But a lack of certainty may also 
be impeding further development and as the market evolves, problems may arise that 
regulators could act now to forestall.  
Customer due diligence and financial security 
  Money laundering legislation obliges financial institutions to take care in verifying the 
identity of prospective clients. This is also good business practice: you want to know with 
whom you are doing business. But where rules are too restrictive or applied with little 
flexibility to accommodate different means of identification, potential clients can be 
excluded. Moreover it is arguable that overly strict identification procedures to help stop 
terrorist financing and money laundering measures can drive actors to use informal channels 
which escape the oversight of regulators. 
  For mobile banks targeting in particular the poor, the un-banked or migrant 
communities, traditional rules in this domain can be prohibitively expensive or even 
impossible to implement. Many potential clients do not have access to the kinds of 
documents prescribed and even if they do, it may be too costly to present them in the proper 
context and time frame. Moreover, suspicion of banks, illiteracy and immigrants’ fear of 
exposing themselves to the scrutiny of host country authorities may all dissuade potential 
clients from even trying to open accounts. 
  The strengthening of rules has in principle been done to help stem the flow of terrorist 
financing and money laundering. These are very important objectives, but it is likely that a 
primary effect of such strengthening is to push more transactions into the informal sector 
where controls and reporting are likely to be absent and hence about which authorities are 
less likely to have any information at all. Lighter rules that encourage more transactions to be 
made via the formal sector would give authorities a chance to learn something about them, 
their senders and receivers.  
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  Rules appropriate to a pro-poor financial sector development agenda should apply a 
risk adjusted approach to different markets and client segments. Authorities realise the 
importance of this. The European Commission proposal for a Regulation of money transfers 
(July 2005) highlighted the need to avoid “driving transactions underground”, suggesting that 
obligations should be applied on a risk sensitive basis for lower value transfers
32.  
Retail market access and competition 
  Without retailers to act as agents, branchless mobile banks would either have to 
curtail their distribution networks - or invest in their own branches. Regulations that affect 
the retail distribution sector can therefore have important indirect effects on the emergence of 
mobile banking. In particular, policies in emerging and developing markets may constrain 
competition in the retail sector, with subsequent consequences for the variety, stability and 
capacities of potential agents. 
  In many economies, not just emerging markets, the retail trade is heavily regulated. 
Often there are restrictions on zoning, foreign market entry, opening hours and pricing 
policies
33. Policies often aim to strike a balance between the benefits from large chains and 
the interest of diversity and small, local retailers
34. But it is precisely such retailers with a 
wide yet standardised distribution network that can be attractive agents for branchless banks. 
Where regulation places limits on their potential for expansion there will a consequent effect 
on the capacity of new banks to find appropriate distribution partners. 
III.C. Consumer protection:  
 
  Elements of consumer protection can limit service and product variations that may be 
necessary for the viability of new business models. Standardisation can enhance 
transparency, the capacity for consumers to compare offers and enforce minimum levels of 
quality. But mobile operators may find that existing product forms enshrined in banking 
codes are somehow not adapted to their mode of supply or the demands of consumers that 
they serve. Familiar limits include caps on interest rates, restrictions on product cross-
subsidisation, and pricing policies. Operators and regulators together need to review 
limitations in their jurisdictions that may pose unnecessary constraints.  
                                                 
32 See the Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on Information on the payer accompanying 
transfers of funds, 2005/0138 
33 For an overview of retail distribution regulation, readers may refer to cross-country comparisons by Boylaud 
and Nicoletti., OECD. 
34 Regulations of this kind can have negative welfare effects on the bulk of consumers because large retailers 
generally have extensive, efficient sourcing and distribution networks which generate competitive advantages. 
Hence there is a fear that they have the power to squeeze out small competitors. 
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  Incomplete contracting standards can also be a problem for the development of new 
service models. This is likely to be the case for banks using remote agents and mobile phones 
as alternatives to face-to-face relationships. Agents will generally not have the power to 
approve client applications, but may be required to validate the authenticity of documents or 
signatures. The legal status of agents in this context may be ambiguous. Authorisation or 
validation of payments via remote mobile tools may not be recognised by existing laws. And 
legal frameworks applicable to mobile telephone payments may be insufficiently defined to 
allocate rights and obligations clearly between clients and their mobile operator/bank in the 
event of operational errors, incidents of theft or fraud or other unforeseen problems. 
Moreover, poor and remote clients are likely to be at a disadvantage to identify, communicate 
and pursue incidents for which their mobile operator may hold responsibility. The level at 
which laws and guidelines may need to be amended to provide a more stable legal framework 
for mobile banking will inevitably vary according to the specific legal and regulatory 
structure in any one jurisdiction. 
  Consumer protection is a key component of any strategy to build confidence in mobile 
banking services. This is especially the case where consumers have entrenched reservations 
about the banking community in their country. Surveys have suggested that many in 
developing countries have a strong distrust of banks and are likely to be sceptical at first 
about giving up physical bank notes for electronic based accounts. There is no one solution to 
building confidence among consumers, educating them and creating feedback mechanisms to 
minimise abuse. Regulators and mobile operators need to search the environment around 
them in each case to find existing assets that can be put to good use to promote and warrant 
consumer confidence.  
  The challenge is particularly important for early innovators. If consumer protection 
measures are too weak, potential first stage entrants may be dissuaded from investing in the 
market at all. Changing consumer habits and perceptions can be very expensive. Early stage 
mobile banks may fear that their efforts will implicitly subsidise second round entrants. And 
as the market develops, it is inevitable that dishonest actors will also be attracted to the 
sector, with the result not only that some potential clients will become victims of fraud but 
that these firms’ activities may damage confidence in honest firms. So it is essential that 
regulators and operators work together on this front to prepare the market and balance 
incentives in a way that encourages first stage development. 
  National regulators may have to develop ways of acting beyond their conventional 
scope of intervention. A promising avenue for developing consumer confidence may be to 
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build on the structure of remittance services. This market provides a natural bridge between 
different social and economic zones, both of which can be used to promote confidence, 
enforce standards and educate consumers. For example, if regulators work effectively with 
each other across borders, recipient countries may be able to enhance local consumer 
protection by acting through supervisory structures in sending countries.
35 Migrant workers 
may also be one of the more effective channels for educating consumers of financial services 
back home. In both cases, national regulators will need to enhance cooperation with other 
authorities at different levels of government – local and international.  
III.D. Disincentives to using formal sector financial services 
 
  Beyond the scope of the financial sector, business regulation and fiscal policy can 
create disincentives to ‘joining the formal sector’
36. Much of the interest in mobile led 
banking stems from its anticipated potential to extend access to formal sector financial 
services. But the use of formal sector finance can expose participants currently operating in 
the informal economy to perceived and real costs: regulation, taxes or, in corrupt economies, 
exploitation by local officials who see banking activity as a signal of wealth that can be 
tapped. 
 
       Table 2: The size of the shadow economy (selected countries) 
 
1999/00 2001/02 2002/03
Congo (DRC) 48 49 50
Kenya 34 35 36
Morocco 36 37 38
Senegal 45 47 48
South Africa 28 29 30
Zimbabwe 59 61 63
Bangladesh 36 37 38
India 23 24 26
Philippines 43 45 46
Ecuador 34 35 37
Guatemala 52 52 52
Peru 60 60 61
1: using the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method; 
Source: Schneider, Friedrich CESIfo Working Paper No. 1806 2006
Latin          
America
















  The direct effect of these perceived and real costs is to suppress demand for formal 
sector banking services. Mobile banking could fail to fulfil its potential not because of supply 
problems but because demand for services is unnecessarily depressed. To the extent that 
joining the formal sector opens up new markets and financing mechanisms to firms and 
                                                 
35 Remittance services providers clearly recognise that they can optimise marketing expenses and measures to 
build confidence in their brand by addressing both senders and recipients of funds. Senders may be better 
educated and familiar with modern banking tools, and hence in a better position to chose quality services and 
reassure family members back home about providers and how to use their products. 
36 Relevant literature includes high profile research by Hernando De Soto and the World Bank on the costs of 
doing business in different countries. 
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incites them to operate more efficiently, this  may be a real missed opportunity to stimulate 
growth and formal sector employment.  
  The issue is far from trivial. In many emerging and developing economies, the 
shadow economy represents an important proportion of overall economic activity. Recent 
cross-country estimates from Schneider (2006) suggest that it represents on average about 
40% of official GDP in most African countries, but can be as high as 60%. Governments 
need to combine the opportunities from extended banking service with initiatives to reduce 
the costs (both perceived and real) to joining the formal sector. 
 
IV. A Policy Agenda 
 
The challenge is not what to do but how. 
  There should be little disagreement in principle that the rise of mobile banking has the 
potential to generate economic and social benefits, by extending access to financial services 
and fostering growth in sector liquidity. Governments and regulators, in advanced as well as 
less developed economies, should therefore be seeking to facilitate the entry of these new 
providers and the development of their financial service business models. But if authorities 
are to continue to pursue the important objectives of financial sector regulation, changes to 
legislation and organisation will be necessary. 
  The challenges lie in identifying specific, pragmatic policies and instruments that can 
be applied effectively within existing structures and without putting at risk the stability or 
integrity of the market and its legal systems. Moreover, public authorities need to be prepared 
not just to introduce one-off changes in legislation or supervisory practices but to spur and 
accompany a longer term, dynamic transformation that mobile businesses may trigger, both 
at home and in coordination with authorities abroad. 
  This section sets out the key objectives that governments should adopt in support of 
pro-poor mobile banking and provides some initial ideas on how to go about pursuing them. 
IV.A. Facilitate entry and growth in the volume and variety of supply 
 
Lower barriers to ‘deposit taking’ for transaction banks. 
  At least during an initial phase of development, regulators should reduce the up-front 
fixed cost barriers to deposit taking for institutions that aim to act as payment or transaction 
banks. To mitigate against a subsequent increase in risk, clear and strict rules should be 
imposed on the use of these funds (the types of assets in which they could be stored) and 
compliance with them monitored. 
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  Carefully select the asset classes in which transaction banks can place depositors’ 
funds. 
  The rules limiting the use of clients’ funds by mobile banks will be very important as 
means to limit risk taking by these more lightly regulated institutions. More broadly, the 
choice of eligible assets will indirectly channel financing to ‘favoured’ recipients. Although 
there may be a temptation to limit the scope of assets to local government bonds this would 
not only create an unwarranted subsidy to governments but waste an opportunity to enhance 
market liquidity and asset diversity. Equally, authorities should resist calls to coerce savers to 
fund domestic ‘development projects’
37. Low risk corporate assets or international bonds 
could provide significant risk diversification opportunities and help boost local sector 
activity. 
 
   Box 5: An overview of policy issues and recommended objectives 
  Issue
Licensing and 
regulation of  
‘deposit taking’
Inappropriate or non-existant 
consumer protection measures/ 




Perceived costs or 
risks of joining the 
formal sector
Relevance / Impact
• Risks and limits on 
outsourcing to agents
• Limited array of
retail partners to act as 
agents
• Inefficient KYC and 
financial security rules
maximisation of 
value of mobile 
banks may rely on 
economies of scope 
with other products 
or client groups.
Make deposit taking more 
contestable; :reform deposit 
taking licensing and regulation
Enhance demand for low cost banking 
and payment services:
- reform costs of formal sector activity
- leverage govt consumption of 
payments
Facilitate innovation in 
distribution models
Develop appropriate 
consumer proctection / 
confidence measures
Support remittance 
markets as a catalyst 
for innovation
Policy Objectives and Actions
Foster healthy incentives for 
new entrants’ development
frames scope for 
settlement innovation 
between mobile banks
Regulation may unduly 
limit strategy for subsequent 
lateral or vertical expansion 
and development.
Erode the potential 
benefits to consumers 











Constrain entry of 
new payment service 
providers
Credit risk profiles 




Foster competition and choice in 

























Create international regulatory structures that facilitate cross-border services and provide a 
degree regulatory competition. 
  International cooperation between regulatory authorities is necessary to facilitate 
mobile banking in remittance markets. The creation of regional or international authorities 
                                                 
37 In particular with regards to remittances, there have been suggestions that ‘money sent home’ could be tapped 
to support local development projects. But regulatory attempts to channel foreign funds in this manner is likely 
to backfire, directing funds to favoured projects and probably persuading senders to remit less and save more in 
their host country where a greater choice of investments may be available. 
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may provide a degree of regulatory competition necessary to promote greater opportunities 
for trade and guard against intransigence or simple abuse of power by national regulators.  
Consider scope for telecoms regulators to act. 
  In the likely event that bureaucratic inertia slows reforms by banking regulators, an 
interim means to incite change may be charging telecoms regulators with some responsibility 
for licensing mobile banks and encouraging them to play a role in consumer protection. 
Faced with this unorthodox mode of regulatory competition, bureaucratic inertia may be 
easier to overcome. Banking experts would need to be seconded to telecom regulators for a 
period of time, but existing expertise and contacts for consumer protection of mobile 
customers could be a useful basis on which to start. 
Set review clauses on reforms, evaluate and adjust.  
  It is important to build in review processes and even a sun-set clause. These are good 
practices and could help to ease negotiations with sceptics worried about the prospect of a 
permanent relaxation of licensing requirements. Insofar as potential new entrants see this as a 
limited window of opportunity during which to gain lower risk entry to the market, it may 
increase the chances of multiple mobile banks entering the market in parallel. Thid may be a 
pragmatic way to enhance the likelihood of coordination between mobile operators. 
  Some authorities already appear to have taken a fairly liberal approach to ‘small’ 
deposits being held by mobile or other institutions for purposes of making and receiving 
payments
38. Greater clarity would aid competition at this early stage.  
IV.B. Foster healthy incentives for new entrants 
  
  Regulators also need to keep in mind that facilitating entry is of little value if potential 
profits from developing the market are too low to actually attract new entrants. Licenses for 
new style institutions can quickly become empty shells if they limit rights and obligations in 
ways that severely delimit earnings potential over the long run
39. The costs of regulatory 
change can easily exceed potential benefits they are meant to generate. Regulation needs to 
allow new entrants early access to earnings potential as well as longer term growth prospects. 
Protect access to central payment infrastructure. 
                                                 
38 M-Pesa, Globe and Crandy all have acquired formal or ad-hoc authorisation to take small deposits from the 
public for the purpose of making payments; for these small amounts, they are also subject to less strict KYC 
rules (that aim to limit money laundering and terrorist financing). 
39 Restrictions on sources of earning may also have undesirable results for consumers. For instance, in the 
absence of potential to earn revenue from FX fees, interest spreads or lending, money transfer agents may 
charge more through transfer fees. It is also possible that the relatively weak demand for e-money licenses in the 
EU is also a case of regulatory shells leaving insufficient room for profitable development by the business. 
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  New payment providers must be able to gain cost effective access to inter-bank 
settlement structures, such as domestic clearing houses, in order to provide main stream 
transaction services. But such clearing houses are often owned by incumbents in the retail 
banking industry with incentives to limit the growth potential of new competitors such as 
mobile banks. Competition authorities and regulators need to review relevant clearing house 
membership rules, technology and fees.  
Facilitate the development of economies of scale across borders. 
  International payments are perhaps the least well developed segment of financial 
markets, both for consumer and business transactions. It may therefore be an area of market 
demand, such as for remittances, in which mobile banks find greatest potential for initial, 
profitable commercial developments. But as an intrinsically dispersed international market, 
achieving economies of scale will require cross-border activities that may conflict with 
formal and informal restrictions on financial services trade (as well as on input services). 
Reductions in these trade barriers may be essential for mobile banks to find the scale 
necessary to propose low cost services, especially in smaller economies.  
Allow for up-market and cross market expansion. 
  Investments by mobile banks will depend on opportunities to expand into new 
products. And it would be unrealistic to expect them to ignore revenue potential from serving 
higher income clients. Similarly, their attention will also turn towards improving the earnings 
potential from customer deposits. Insofar as regulation only allows them to provide payments 
to the poor and the unbanked, mobile banking may fail to reach the critical mass necessary to 
bring down marginal costs of banking services for the wider population. Moreover, 
regulations that severely limit mobile banks to serving only the unbanked may give rise to 
undesirable divisions between poor and advanced financial services – a sort of financial 
sector apartheid. There should be transparent and fair processes open to mobile banks that 
decide at a later stage to develop these sides of the business. 
Guard against anti-competitive behaviour by incumbents. 
  As in other concentrated, network based industries, incumbents may find numerous 
ways to guard against competition from new entrants. The capacity of competition authorities 
to monitor and assess market developments will need to be enhanced in many markets. Tools 
to address anti-competitive behaviour need to be reviewed and strengthened. Measures may 
need to be taken to support compatibility between payment networks. 
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IV.C. Render operational innovation easier and less risky. 
 
  Mobile banking operators are using their cost advantages and distribution networks to 
reach out to lower income clients, many of whom are active in the informal sector. To 
facilitate this, they are stretching the boundaries of traditional client acquisition and 
distribution processes. Policy makers should be seeking to adjust guidelines and develop 
instruments that support these innovations yet enable authorities to continue to pursue their 
objectives. 
Regulators should revise outsourcing rules. 
  This applies in particular to guidelines for client account opening, cash 
deposit/withdrawal and other services provided through non-bank distribution partners (or 
agents). In many economies there has already been significant growth in agent based banking 
and in some jurisdictions regulatory frameworks are beginning to take shape. Elsewhere 
regulators should be reassuring new or potential entrants about their willingness to support 
this form of outsourcing. In those jurisdictions with initial experience, multi-stakeholder 
groups should be conducting reviews and drafting improved guidance. 
Customer due diligence guidelines need to be adjusted.  
  To facilitate the acquisition of clients remotely, and those without standard 
documentation, regulators need to devise more appropriate and proportionate KYC rules that 
facilitate business with these types of clients but still allow governments to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing.  
  First, authorities should be sure that alternatives to traditional identification means 
have been explored to minimise exclusion. Secondly, rules should be applied in ways that are 
proportionate to the risks posed by transaction and client types. Not all users, locations or 
sums represent the same risks. Mobile operators may even be able to support surveillance by 
contributing new data (e.g. call patterns) to statistical profiling. 
Retail sector regulation and competition should be reviewed. 
  Banking regulators should work together with government authorities responsible for 
retail sector policy in order to enhance the health of the sector and its potential role as a 
complement to retail financial services providers. It is in the interest of both consumers and 
these types of banking institutions that potential retail agents are stable, operate in a secure 
legal environment and in a market place with sufficient variety and competition to improve 
alternatives to mobile banks seeking agents and, indirectly, to the end client.  
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IV.D. Enhance demand for low cost banking and payment services 
 
Rebalance the costs of formal sector participation. 
  Disincentives to formal sector participation and the perceived costs or threats from 
holding a bank account need to be reduced. Governments need to investigate:  
(1) The extent which these kinds of disincentives exist and to whom they apply: e.g. What are 
the real and perceived costs of doing business in the formal sector? Do small traders really 
fear public scrutiny from using a formal banking service? Are these fears justified?; and, 
(2) Design remedies that can be simply implemented: e.g. Is there a role for tax amnesties 
and exemptions? Can consumers be assured of confidentiality and data protection? Can 
formal sector registration costs and processes be simplified? 
 
Benefit from the public sector’s role as a consumer of payment services. 
  Another area in which demand can be enhanced is in the use of mobile banking 
services by governments to distribute social and other benefits. Where these distribution 
processes can be achieved more efficiently using bank transfers and use of funds influenced 
more effectively, by for instance limiting validity to specific services (e.g. health), 
governments can play an important role in providing incentives to the unbanked to gain 
initial access to the financial sector by opening a mobile (or other appropriate) bank account.  
 
IV.E. Devise appropriate consumer protection measures 
 
  As discussed above, existing consumer protection measures will probably need to be 
adjusted to mobile banking and new measures will need to be devised in order to support 
consumer confidence in these potential banking innovations. Some initiatives that regulators 
and mobile operators may want to investigate include:  
•  Ombudsmen schemes: An independent and respected person in the community can 
be a representative for receiving and acting upon client complaints. They can help 
to enhance real and perceived market integrity. But these persons position may also 
be liable to abuse or be devoid of actual influence.  
•  Self regulation: Where a sufficient number of new entrants develop the market 
together, there may be significant scope for regulators to place responsibilities upon 
them to collectively set common standards and operate their own operational 
controls to protect market integrity. 
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•  Private monitoring and certification: Independent consumer or financial services 
firms may be able to play a role in assessing and monitoring the quality of mobile 
banks and their operations. In low income markets the costs of their operations may 
be too high to be sustained without some form of public subsidy. 
•  Joint education programmes: Mobile banks could, beyond the scope of self 
regulation, engage in programmes to enhance financial awareness and education. 
IV.F. Facilitate innovation via the remittance markets 
  
  As a key market in which mobile banks are already working, remittance services 
should be a priority area for public policy action. By expanding opportunities in this domain 
for firms to develop cross-border economies of scale and more lucrative products, regulators 
can help to increase the incentives for mobile operators to invest and experiment. A number 
of steps could be taken to achieve this goal
40:  
•  Permit cross-border provision of retail financial service. This should include the 
marketing of deposit accounts, credit products and transfers. Some important 
examples of these cross-border services have been developed
41. Their potential as a 
conduit for lower cost financing should be investigated. 
•  Facilitate off-shore accounts for remittance recipients. International payments are 
expensive because accounts and banking structures are aligned with national and 
currency boundaries. If banks were at greater liberty to offer multi-currency 
offshore accounts, incentives to improve cross-border retail payment structures may 
rise.  
•  Develop mutual recognition of legal and regulatory frameworks. In particular for 
specialised lending products in high volume corridors, regulatory coordination is 
important. Cross-border products are difficult to promote if they remain tied to 
home country legal systems.  
•  Facilitate cross border participation in domestic retail clearing systems. 
International access may improve competition in the market for international 
wholesale liquidity and payment services. 
                                                 
40 Other useful proposals are included in the BIS/World Bank General Principles for remittance services. 
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